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Abstract: Understanding the formation and consequences of formal military 
alliances is a research area that is central to the study of international 
relations. Military alliances help define and shape the nature of interactions 
between countries, and by structuring international obligations; they help 
construct the nature of the international system. Over time, countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa have been faced with myriads of security challenges, ranging 
from militancy, ethno-religious crisis, political conflict, human and drug 
trafficking, to trans-border crimes. In recent times however, terrorism and 
insurgency have become a major security threat to the sovereignty of these 
countries, particularly the threat of Boko Haram in the Northeast of Nigeria 
and countries of the Lake Chad region; hence the formation of the Multi-
National Joint Task Force as a military alliance to combat terrorism. The 
paper is thus, an attempt to investigate the role of the Multi-National Joint 
Task Force (MNJTF) in countering Boko Haram terrorism within Nigeria, 
Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. In interrogating the above problem, this paper 
scooped from secondary data and employed the Simon Walt‘s theory of 
alliance as analytical framework. It is the position of the paper that the 
MNJTF has made remarkable achievement in the fight against Boko Haram. 
In the final analysis, the paper recommends, among other things, the need for 
participating states in the MNJTF to be much more committed in terms of 
funding and purchase of military equipment to further enhance military 
preparedness and capabilities.     
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Alliances play a central role in 
international relations because they are 
seen to be an integral part of statecraft. 
Alliances are formed between two or 
more countries to counter a common 
adversary. They have been an important 
research focus in the theory of 
international relations. This is 
understandable because one of the 
central foreign policy debates in every 
country centres on the issue of ‗which 
nation to ally with and for how long‘. 
Strong and weak nations alike feel the 
need to form alliances. Weak states 
enter into alliance when they need 
protection against strong states, that is, 
they enter into alliances to protect or 
defend themselves. Strong states enter 
into alliances to counter other strong 
states- they enter into alliances to 
maintain balance of power. States 
expect their allies to help militarily and 
diplomatically during the time of 
conflict (Sangit, 2012). 
 
Much of the realist-neoliberal debates 
can be interpreted as an argument over 
whether a balance of power or 
collective security equilibrium is more 
stable or is a more appropriate 
characterization of contemporary affairs 
(Niou and Ordeshook 1991). Benson 
and Clinton (2014), identification of the 
range of alliances that exist and probing 
the conditions under which various 
types of alliances are likely to be 
formed along the dimensions of scope, 
depth, and potential military capacity of 
formal military alliances, are key to 
understanding the role of military 
alliances in structuring the international 
system. 
 
Scholars generally agree that alliance 
agreements typically specify the 
primary obligations of alliance 
members, some of which require 
members to become involved militarily 
in a broad set of circumstances, while 
others are more limited in scope. For 
example, Snyder (1997) explains that 
offensive alliance agreements obligate 
alliance members in a wide range of 
circumstances compared to those 
written to secure a third party‘s 
neutrality in the case of a military 
conflict. This is the standard view of 
alliances—agreements with offensive 
and defensive provisions obligate 
members to commit military action to a 
broader range of circumstances than 
defensive agreements alone, and 
defensive agreements are broader in 
military scope than, say, consultation 
pacts or neutrality agreements, which 
do not bind signatories to commit 
militarily to any conflict and may even 
require states not to become involved 
militarily (Benson and Clinton, 2014). 
Scholars have emphasized the 
importance of these concepts for 
characterizing and understanding the 
formation and consequences of military 
alliances (Snyder 1997; Leeds et al, 
2002; Schelling, 1966; Benson, 2011, 
2012; `and Leeds and Anac, 2005). 
 
The emergence of the Boko Haram 
terrorist group in 2009 and its activities 
have posed a lot of security threats to 
Nigeria. However, the trans-national 
nature of this terrorist group, as it 
operates beyond the shores of Nigeria, 
reaching into other neighbouring 
countries such as Cameroon, Chad and 
Niger has qualified it to be an 
international terrorist organization. 
Since 2013, the Boko Haram terrorist 
group has frequently attacked towns 
and villages, security outposts and 
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schools, and has also kidnapped 
civilians, foreign tourists and 
missionaries in the border regions of 
Cameroon. Recently, there have been 
an increasing number of attacks in the 
Lake Chad Basin region along Nigeria‘s 
borders with Chad and Cameroon and 
in the northern provinces of Cameroon 
(AU, 2015). The international 
dimension of Boko Haram and its 
implications for sub-regional security 
necessitated the formation of the Multi-
National Joint Task Force by Nigeria, 
Cameroon, Chad, Niger (which were 
complemented by Benin, Nigeria‘s 
immediate neighbor to the west) as a 
strategic military alliance to address and 
combat Boko Haram terrorism within 
the sub-region. 
 
Conceptual and Theoretical Issues 
The dynamic nature of international 
relations and the need for states to 
pursue and promote their national 
interest have made alliance an 
important component of global politics. 
Alliance can manifest in different 
forms: it could be security alliance or 
defence alliance, as the case may be. 
What is however more important is the 
fact that states do form alliances either 
to contain perceived threats or to 
balance power against a stronger 
enemy.  
 
The concept of alliance in the literature 
of international relations is ambiguous 
and amorphous (Edwin, 1968). 
Reflecting on this important role of 
alliances in world politics, the literature 
in international relations has produced 
quite an impressive list of interesting 
studies, articles and analyses in this area 
of research. However, it seems striking 
that despite these scholarly attempts, 
not much thought has been given to the 
question, "what is a military alliance?‖ 
(Edwin, 1968). An ordinary meaning of 
the term ―alliance‖ can be found in 
Webster‘s Encyclopedic Dictionary, 
which defines it as: 
 a) the state of being allied;  
b) a bond or connection between 
families, parties, or individuals;    
c) an association (as by treaty) of two or 
more nations to further their common 
interests;  
d) a treaty of alliance.   
 
This meaning also corresponds to the 
historical development of the term 
"alliance". The corresponding German 
term, "Allianz" developed in the 17th 
century out of the French word 
"alliance", which meant "connection", 
"pact" or "association between states". 
This French term, in turn, goes back to 
the old French verb aleier (= to connect, 
to combine, to join), which is itself 
rooted in the Latin verb alligare. 
Alligare, finally, is a compositum of 
Latin "ligare" (= to bind) and could be 
translated as "to bind" and "to combine" 
(Duden, 1963). 
 
In the realist view, "the historically 
most important manifestation of the 
balance of power ... is to be found ... in 
the relations between one nation or 
alliance and another alliance" 
(Morgenthau 1959:169) because 
"alliances and regional coalitions 
among the weak to defend themselves 
from the strong have been the typical 
method for preserving ... balance" 
(Wright 1965:773). An alliance is a 
collective security arrangements among 
states in which all members of the 
alliance agree to not threaten each 
other, to punish defectors from this 
agreement whenever possible, and to 
threaten countries outside of the 
alliance whenever it is in their 
individual interest to do so. 
 
Insofar as our understanding of 
alliances is concerned, we are aided by 
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the fact that definitions come within 
striking distance of acceptability by 
even rigorous theoretical standards. In 
the view of  Walt's (1987:12) : "an 
alliance is a formal or informal 
arrangement for security cooperation 
between two or more sovereign states;"  
to Snyder's (1990:104): "alliances ... are 
formal associations of states for the use 
(or non-use) of military force, intended 
for either the security or the 
aggrandizement of their members, 
against specific other states..."his view 
tallies with that of  Liska (1968) whose 
sees  alliance basically as a formal 
association between two or more states 
against the threat of a third, more 
powerful state. The association itself is 
what Liska calls an "alignment" and 
corresponds to the predictions of the 
balance of power theory. Alliances for 
him – although he uses the terms almost 
interchangeably – merely formalize 
these alignments. Conflicts are thus for 
him the primary determinant of 
alignments and alliances, with threat 
and power potential used as synonyms 
as usual in the balance of power 
literature: "Alliances are against, and 
only derivatively for, someone or 
something" (Liska (1968). 
 
Alliance is described as a process or a 
technique of statecraft or a type of 
international organization (Fedder 
1968: 68). Arnold Wolfer (1968: 268) 
sees an alliance as „a promise of mutual 
military assistance between two or more 
sovereign states‟. Alliances are only the 
formal subset of a broader and more 
basic phenomenon, than that of 
„alignment‟ (Snyder 1990: 105). The 
primary purpose of most alliances is to 
combine the member‘s capabilities in a 
way that furthers their respective 
interests. 
 Holsti, Hopmann and Sullivan 
developed another very germane 
perspective on alliance. They were of 
the opinion that for an association to 
qualify as an alliance it must poses the 
following elements:  
 i. A formal treaty – open or secret  
ii. It must be directly concerned with 
national security issues  
iii. The partners must be nation-states 
On the basis of these three elements 
the authors define the concept as 
follows: "an alliance is a formal 
agreement between two or more 
nations to collaborate on national 
security issues"(Holsti, et al, 1973). 
 
Theoretical Framework 
Theories are important instrument in 
every scientific investigation, as they 
serve as lenses which give insight and 
clarity to the researcher. For the 
purpose of this study, Stephen M. 
Walt‘s theory of alliance will be 
employed. This is not to say that there 
are no other theories that can be used to 
examine the issues under investigation. 
Walt‘s ―balance-of-threat‖ theory of 
alliance formation (1988) is examined 
as a focus theory. An attempt to 
examine alliances and the factors 
precipitating can be better fashioned 
within the context of certain 
fundamental questions. No wonder 
Walt (1988) began his analysis of 
alliance by putting forward some 
germane questions such as ―When will 
states form alliances, and what 
determines their choice of allies?‖  
More specifically, do states tend to 
balance against strong or threatening 
powers by allying against them; are 
they more likely to ―bandwagon‖ by 
allying with the most powerful or 
threatening states?  If states tend to 
balance, ―aggressors will face numerous 
opponents and sustained efforts to 
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expand are likely to fail.‖  However, if 
‗bandwagoning‘ is the dominant 
tendency, ―threats and intimidation are 
more likely to work, and empires will 
both be easier to amass and more likely 
to fall apart. In his analysis of the factor 
that necessitates alliance, he critiques 
the balance of power theory and 
emphasized the role of threat in alliance 
formation. Walt further argued that 
balance-of-power theory focused on 
capabilities and ignores other factors 
that statesmen consider when making 
alliance choices.  Threat, not power, is 
at the heart of security concerns. 
According to Walt, balance-of-power 
theory does not well describe the 
observed behavior of alliance formation 
in the historical record.  It cannot 
explain why balances often fail to form.  
His balance-of-threat theory gives a 
better description.  In Walt‘s view, 
threat level is characterized by: 
i.  Overall capabilities  
ii.  Proximity  
iii.  Offensive capability (vs. 
defensive)  
iv.  Perceived intentions 
Other things being equal, states 
that are nearby are more 
dangerous than those that  are 
far away.  States with large 
offensive capabilities defined as 
the capacity to threaten the 
sovereignty of other states pose 
a greater threat than states whose 
capabilities are more suitable for 
defense.  Lastly, states with 
aggressive intentions are more 
threatening than those who seek 
only to preserve the status quo.  
If balancing behaviour is the 
norm, therefore, an increase in 
any of these Factors power, 
proximity, offensive capabilities, 
or aggressive intentions should 
encourage other states to ally 
against the most threatening 
power (Walt, 1988, 281). 
Walt characterizes the concepts of 
balancing and bandwagoning as ideal 
types, and that ―actual state behavior 
will only approximate either model.‖  
(Walt, 1988: 282)  Another problem of 
interpreting the historical record is 
distinguishing between bandwagoning 
and détente.  In Walt‘s view: 
Bandwagoning involves unequal 
exchange; the vulnerable state makes 
asymmetrical concessions to the 
dominant power and accepts a 
subordinate role. Détente, by contrast, 
involves roughly equal concessions in 
which both sides benefit (Walt 1988, 
282). 
 
Thus Walt (1988) puts forward three 
types of state behavior within the 
context of alliance and they are:  
i.  Balancing is alignment against the 
threatening power (rather than the 
most powerful one) to deter it.  
ii.  Bandwagoning is alignment with a 
dominant power, either to appease it 
or in the hope of profiting from its 
victory. (Unequal exchange, often 
coerced.  Dominant power may 
extract significant, asymmetrical 
concessions, High risk.  Requires 
trust that the dominant power will be 
benevolent). 
iii. Détente is the voluntary 
development of peaceful relations to 
reduce tensions.         (Equal 
exchange.  Symmetrical concessions.  
Low risk.  The dominant power‘s 
attempt to exploit the relationship 
will collapse the détente.   The state 
remains aligned with the balancing 
power against the threatening power) 
From the foregoing, it is obvious that 
this theory is very germane to the topic 
under investigation. One basic 
argument of this theory is the fact that 
states form alliance not to balance 
power but to curtail and contain threats. 
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This is also clearly manifested in the 
Multi-National Joint Task Force which 
as establish not for the sake of balance 
power against a stronger state but for 
the purpose of containing Boko Haram 
terrorist group which constitute a major 
threat to all member states of the 
MNJTF. Deterrence is also an 
important aspect of the theory. The 
MNJTF also serves as deterrence to 
Boko Haram. Aside the utilization of 
coercion the states also employ 
diplomatic means which should 
eventually lead to détente.  It is also 
important to note that Bandwagoning 
does not really apply to  the MNJTF as 
an alliance because the relationship that 
exist between the LCBC and Benin is 
not one of unequal exchange neither is 
any member of the alliance coerced into 
the alliance. The MNJTF as an alliance 
is a product of collective interest for 
collective security and as such every 
ally hitherto forming the alliance knew 
how important this alliance will be as 
far as their national security and the 
security of the sub-region is concerned. 
 
Multinational Joint Task Force and 
Counter-Terrorism in Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
States within the international system 
are beginning to realize the importance 
of alliances and also recognizing that 
alliances are not necessarily for balance 
of power but more importantly that 
alliances are strategies for addressing 
perceived, existing and potential threats 
to their security especially in 
contemporary times where there are 
galaxies of threats manifested in forms 
of insurgency, terrorism, ethnic militias, 
piracy, trans-border crimes etc. sub-
Saharan Africa is faced with a lot of 
security challenges among which is 
terrorism. Terrorism within West Africa 
has attracted international attention 
because of its catastrophic impact. 
 
The impact and implications of Boko 
Haram on sub-regional security 
instigated the affected states to form a 
military alliance against terrorism. This 
move/step was also supported by the 
African Union when it specifically 
urged the countries of the region to take 
the necessary steps towards 
operationalizing the mechanisms agreed 
upon to address more effectively the 
threat posed by Boko Haram. 
Subsequently, a number of initiatives 
were taken by the countries of the 
region pursuant to the conclusions of 
the Paris Summit of 17 May 2014, 
which brought together the Heads of 
State of Benin, Chad, Cameroon, 
France, Niger, Nigeria and other 
stakeholders, as well as the ministerial- 
level meetings that took place in 
London and Washington on 12 June 
and 5 August 2014, respectively (AU, 
2015). 
 
Transnational efforts to combat crime in 
the region predate the emergence of the 
terrorist movement. The Multinational 
Joint Task Force (MNJTF) between 
Nigeria, Chad and Niger was set up in 
1998 in order to combat transnational 
crime in the Lake Chad region, but was 
mostly dormant until 2012, when it was 
reactivated in order to deal with Boko 
Haram. In order to cope with the spread 
of terrorism in the region, the Paris 
Summit of May 2014, which brought 
together the heads of state of Benin, 
Chad, Cameroon, France, Niger and 
Nigeria, and representatives of the US, 
UK and EU, decided to enhance 
regional cooperation in the fight against 
Boko Haram, by means of coordinated 
patrols and border surveillance, pooling 
intelligence and exchanging relevant 
information (Zamfir, 2015).  
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In October 2014, the Lake Chad Basin 
Commission (LCBC) member-states 
(Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria) 
and Benin decided to improve their 
cooperation to combat Boko Haram, by 
pledging troops to the MNJFT, which 
should have become operational inside 
national borders by November 2014 
(Zamfir, 2015). 
 
It is important to note that the Paris 
Summit agreed on a number of steps 
aimed at enhancing regional 
cooperation and international action 
against the Boko Haram terrorist group, 
notably through coordinated border 
patrols; the establishment of an 
intelligence and fusion unit; the 
adoption of sanctions against Boko 
Haram, Ansaru, and their main leaders; 
as well as through support for 
marginalized areas and for their 
vulnerable populations. The London 
meeting reaffirmed the commitments 
made at the Paris Summit and 
welcomed the progress accomplished 
since then, particularly the signing in 
Yaoundé, on 9 June 2014, of the 
Memorandum of Understanding on the 
Regional Intelligence Fusion Unit 
(RIFU) (AU, 2015).  
 
Mandate and Objectives of the Multi-
National Joint Task Force 
The AU gave the green light to the 
MNJTF through a decision of 29 
January 2015 by the African Peace and 
Security Council (PSC), meeting at the 
level of Heads of State and 
Government. The PSC is a standing 
decision-making body of the AU, 
competent for peace and security issues 
(Zamfir, 2015). While this process is 
underway, it is recommended that, in 
support of the efforts led by the LCBC 
Member States and Benin, Council 
authorize the deployment of the MNJTF 
comprising up to 7500 military and 
non-military staff, for an initial period 
of twelve months renewable at the 
request of the LCBC Member States 
and Benin (AU, 2015).  
 
In line with the overall objective set by 
the countries of the region during their 
various meetings, it is proposed that the 
MNJTF be mandated, within its Area of 
Operation (AoR) as will be determined 
in the concept of operation, to: 
i. create a safe and secure environment 
in the areas affected by the activities 
of Boko Haram and other terrorist 
groups, in order to significantly 
reduce violence against civilians and 
other abuses, including sexual- and 
gender-based violence, in full 
compliance with international law, 
including international humanitarian 
law and the UN Human Rights Due 
Diligence Policy (HRDDP);   
ii. facilitate the implementation of 
overall stabilization programmes by 
the LCBC Member States and Benin 
in the affected areas, including the 
full restoration of state authority and 
the return of IDPs and refugees; and  
iii. Facilitate, within the limit of its 
capabilities, humanitarian operations 
and the delivery of assistance to the 
affected populations. 
Within the framework of the mandate 
outlined above and in its AoR, the 
MNJTF contingents deployed within 
their national territories may carry out a 
number of tasks. These will include the 
following: 
i. conducting military operations to 
prevent the expansion of Boko 
Haram and other terrorist groups 
activities and eliminate their 
presence;   
ii. facilitating operational coordination 
amongst the affected countries in 
the fight against Boko Haram and 
other terrorist groups, including on 
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the basis of the intelligence 
collected by the LCBC Member 
States and Benin and/or availed by 
external partners;   
iii.  encouraging and facilitate the 
conduct of 
joint/simultaneous/coordinated 
patrols and other types of 
operations at the borders of the 
affected countries;  
iv.  preventing all forms of transfer of 
arms and ammunition and other 
type of support to  Boko Haram and 
other terrorist groups;   
v. ensuring, within its capabilities, the 
protection of civilians under 
immediate threat, IDP and refugee 
camps, humanitarian workers and 
other civilian personnel;  
vi.  actively searching for, and freeing 
all abductees, including the young 
girls abducted in Chibok in April 
2014;  
vii.  undertaking effective 
psychological operations to 
encourage defections from Boko 
Haram and other terrorist groups;    
viii. supporting, as maybe appropriate, 
the initial implementation phase of 
strategies for disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration of 
disengaged fighters into their 
communities ;    
ix. contributing to the improvement 
and institutionalization of civil-
military coordination, including the 
provision, upon request, of escorts 
to humanitarian convoys; (AU, 
2015: 6-7) 
 
Achievements, Challenges and 
Prospects of the Multi-National Joint 
Task Force 
There is no doubt that since the 
establishment of the MNJTF, it has 
recorded some degree of success in the 
fight against terrorism within the sub—
region. However, most works on the 
achievements of MNJTF are not 
thematically stated particularly as it 
relates to clear data and figures, 
geopolitical areas where such 
achievements are recorded. According 
to Oluwadare (2016) the MNJTF, with 
its headquarters in Ndjamena, has been 
able to canalize the insurgents and 
restrict them within the Sambisa forest 
as the push against them was on all 
fronts. The present situation sees the 
fighting deescalating given the 
successes that the MNJTF has achieved. 
For instance, the cases of bombing have 
drastically reduced since the line of 
supply of the insurgents had been cut. 
They now lack food and ammunition, 
and even communication to the outside 
world seems to have been reduced. 
Other achievements of the MNJTF 
include an improvement of the security 
situation as many of the territories 
hitherto controlled by the insurgents 
have been taken back and people are 
returning home. 
 
It was based on the foregoing that 
Feltman, United Nations Under-
Secretary-General for Political Affairs, 
posit that: 
We commend the Lake Chad 
Basin countries‘ efforts to combat 
Boko Haram. The regional 
offensive involving Chadian, 
Cameroonian, Nigerien and 
Nigerian troops operating under 
the Multinational Joint Task Force 
(MNJTF) has recaptured 80 per 
cent of the areas once under Boko 
Haram control, freed thousands of 
captives and prevented terrorist 
attacks (Feltman, 2016:2). 
 
In the view of Zamfir (2015), the 
approach adopted by the AU has raised 
some doubts among commentators. As 
far as the timeframe is concerned, 
logistical difficulties, together with the 
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attitudes of the countries involved – 
which have always tended to focus 
more on their own interests than on a 
regional approach – could delay the 
operationalization of this force. 
However, recent efforts suggest that the 
force could take shape soon. The 
number of troops is seen as insufficient 
to combat Boko Haram effectively, 
given its military capacity. The problem 
of funding has not yet been solved, and 
it will require the UN to set up a fund 
for the operations. 
 
In relations to poor funding Feltman 
(2016:2) maintains that: 
MNJTF‘s main challenge remains 
a severe lack of funding. The 1 
February African Union donor 
conference aimed to mobilize $750 
million, of which only $250 
million was pledged; even less was 
disbursed. The success of MNJTF 
operations also depends on timely 
and actionable intelligence as well 
as specialized counter-terrorism 
skills and equipment, given the 
evolving tactics of Boko Haram. 
Feltman further posits thus: 
So far, the Lake Chad Basin 
countries have borne the financial 
responsibility of combating Boko 
Haram despite their own economic 
crises. As President Deby Itno 
explained to me with frustration, 
they have been forced to divert 
national spending away from basic 
services to security. Lake Chad 
Basin leaders have expressed their 
growing impatience over delays by 
international partners to support 
the MNJTF financially (Feltman, 
2016:2) 
During the period under consideration, 
the Boko Haram terrorist group has 
continued to carry out numerous 
attacks, targeting civilians, police, 
churches, mosques, and public 
facilities, including schools. In early 
January 2015, Boko Haram overran a 
military base in northeastern Nigeria 
that was the headquarters of the MNJTF 
located in Baga, Borno State. The group 
then forced thousands of people from 
the region, burnt and destroyed homes 
and businesses, and committed mass 
killings. Mention should also be made 
of the 10 and 11 January 2015 suicide 
bombings in Maiduguri, Borno State, 
and Potiskum, Yobe State, reportedly 
involving children coerced by Boko 
Haram to act as suicide bombers (AU, 
2015). 
 
Attacks by Boko Haram continue, 
mainly in north- eastern Nigeria and 
southern Niger, and to a lesser extent in 
northern Cameroon and the Lac region 
of Chad. Terrorists persist in targeting 
innocent civilians, often using young 
children. Despite commendable 
regional efforts, the group continues to 
threaten regional stability, as illustrated 
by the 3 June attack on a military base 
in Bosso town, south-eastern Niger 
(Feltman, 2016). 
 
The most recent is the abducted four 
persons contracted by the Nigerian 
National Petroleum Corporation 
(NNPC) for oil exploration in the Lack 
Chad Basin among whom where 
lecturers of the University of Maiduguri 
on the 28th of July, 2017. This view 
was captured by Sahara Reporters 
(2017) when it they claimed that: 
The so-called Islamic State 
faction of the sectarian terrorist 
group, Boko Haram, has claimed 
responsibility for the attack on a 
military-escorted convoy of oil 
exploration workers in the Chad 
Basin. Scores of soldiers and 
civilians died in the ambush. 
According to sources within the 
leadership of the insurgent group, 
the Islamist terrorists did not 
immediately realize the 
composition of the convoy when 
they launched their attack. Such 
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attacks on convoy are a common 
occurrence in Nigeria's 
beleaguered northeast zone where 
Boko Haram militants have been 
most active 
This view was further confirmed by 
Zamfir, (2015: 6), when he claimed 
that:  
At the beginning of 2015, the 
MNJTF headquarters fell into the 
hands of Boko Haram militants, 
together with the town of Baga in 
north-eastern Nigeria where it 
was sited. It appears that, by that 
time, only troops from Nigeria 
were stationed there, as Niger and 
Chad had withdrawn their own 
troops because of security risks. 
It is important to note that defence is an 
expensive venture and defence alliances 
are even more expensive. Hence the 
inability of the UN Secretary-General to 
establishment the  Trust Fund for the 
sustenance of the MNJTF operations as 
proposed  and  the mobilization of the 
necessary international financial and 
logistical support constitute a major 
challenge to the MNJTF. 
 
All these challenges notwithstanding, 
the MNJTF has a lot of prospects. For 
the fact that ECOWAS, African Union 
and the United Nations see the MNJTF 
as a laudable mechanism means they 
seriously believe that the MNJTF if 
well managed and operationalized has 
what it takes to counter Boko Haram 
within the Sub-region. The 
establishment of the UN Trust Fund for 
the sustenance of the MNJTF will go a 
long way to address the challenge of 
funding. For the fact that the LCBC 
members are presently victims of Boko 
Haram and Benin a potential victim will 
motivate them to be more committed 
since their collective interest is at stack. 
 
The MNJTF, established by the Lake 
Chad Basin countries to combat Boko 
haram, still struggles to demonstrate its 
effectiveness. Observers also continue 
to question to what extent it is 
operational. Yet despite the numerous 
political, logistical, technical and 
financial challenges it has been facing, 
the MNJTF is gradually gaining 
grounds. 
 
Conclusion and Recommendation 
Military alliances are an important 
strategy for curbing threats and the 
MNJTF as a military alliance has 
contributed in no small way in 
combating Boko Haram terrorism 
within the Lake Chad sub-region. 
However, the LCBC must realize that 
military approach is not the only 
panacea to combating terrorism. Hence, 
there is the need to address the socio-
economic and political situations that 
led to the emergence of terrorism in the 
region.  
 
Specifically, the following are critical 
to containing the spread or popularity of 
the philosophy of violence advanced by 
the terrorist group: 
i. There is need to convey of a donors‘ 
conference to mobilize resources for 
the MNJTF and appeal to the 
international partners to support the 
implementation of the LCBC 
strategy against Boko Haram; 
ii. There is the need for the United 
Nations to urgently establish the 
Trust Fund for the sustenance of the 
MNJTF so as to address the 
challenge of funding; 
iii. The African Union also needs to go 
beyond condemning the activities of 
Boko Haram in principle, but giving 
practical military and financial 
support to the MNJTF. The AU 
needs to  take pro-active steps to 
address the challenge of terrorism 
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iv. The MNJTF‘s partners should give 
concrete effect to their pledges of 
material, financial and technical 
assistance in order to strengthen 
operational capacities (mobility, 
communications, intelligence) that 
would enable it to operate effectively
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